It had been sustained pressure and legal challenge from the Association of Convenience Stores (ACS) which, in early 2005, had effectively forced the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) to refer the market for the supply of groceries in the UK to the Competition Commission for investigation of several features that could reasonably be suspected of distorting competition. The ACS had argued vehemently that the Commission's so-called`two market' ruling (Competition Commission, 2000; 2003) öwhich viewed the`one-stop' grocery shopping market in the UK (stores above 15 000 ft 2 , 1400 m 2 ) as a separate sector from the`secondary' grocery shopping market (stores below that size) and which had provided a regulatory`green light' for significant acquisitions of chains of convenience stores (stores below 3000 ft 2 , 280 m 2 ) between 2003 and 2005 by Tesco and Sainsburyöhad resulted in potentially terminal damage to the small and specialist independent store sector in the UK. Evidence had been provided by the ACS of a significant decline in the numbers of independent convenience stores in the UK since the release of the Commission's Supermarkets Inquiry findings in 2000 (OFT, 2006, page 17) . The ACS's concerns were also shared, and actively articulated, by several environmentally focused pressure groups and NGOs [eg Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE), 2006; Friends of the Earth (FoE), 2006; New Economics Foundation (NEF), 2005] , who feared that the entry of corporate retail into the small store sector would precipitate a significant loss of the diversity and amenity associated with small, independent, and genuinely local shops on British high streets. A similar position was also adopted by the All-Party Parliamentary Small Shops Group (2006) and expressed in its report High Street Britain 2015.
In the context of this active campaigning, which had successfully established a widespread public perception that independent convenience stores in the UK were in sharp declineöthe often repeated headline phrase being that more than 20% of independent stores had closed in four years and more than 2000 in the year to 2005 (1) öthe provisional findings of the Competition Commission in October 2007 provided a very considerable disappointment both to the ACS and to associated groups. The Commission concluded that, contrary to the widely held view, it did not consider that the convenience store sector was in broad decline; neither did it believe that British high streets were experiencing an accelerating decline in their small and specialist stores. Rather, it found evidence of considerable new entry and robust growth within certain categories of small stores ömost significantly in independent convenience store numbers in some areas of the UK ötogether, more widely, with evidence which demonstrated that competitive entry by larger format corporate food retail was not uniformly associated with negative impacts on the small store sector. On the basis of its investigations, the Commission concluded that it could``not find any significant distortions in competition between large grocery retailers and convenience store operators.'' As a result, it did``not consider that the expansion into convenience store retailing by large grocery retailers such as Sainsbury's and Tesco is having an adverse effect on competition'' (Competition Commission, 2007a, page 14) . Editorial commentary on these findings in The Economist (1 November 2007) neatly summed up the position of the groups who had vigorously campaigned for the Inquiry with the phrase``be careful what (1) This headline appears to be attributable to evidence presented to the All-Party Inquiry on the Future of the High Street (The Guardian 2005, 10 November, page 26). Information provided by the ACS to the OFT (OFT, 2006, page 17) suggested that a gross decline of independent (unaffiliated) you ask for''ösuggesting that in the light of the Commission's conclusions those groups were likely to``rue the day'' they had forced a probe of UK grocery retailing.
Six months later, on 30 April 2008, the Commission released its Final Report on the Inquiry (Competition Commission, 2008) . The additional elements within the Final Report largely concerned the remedies proposed by the Commission in relation to restrictive covenants and exclusivity arrangements in highly concentrated local markets, a proposal that there should be a new`competition test' as part of the planning process, and the establishment of an Ombudsman to oversee a revised Code of Practice relating to supply chain practices. With respect to the convenience store market the Commission drew attention to the fact that convenience store sales had continued to grow faster than total grocery sales (page 88), and reiterated the views it had expressed in the Provisional Findingsönamely that``any distortion in competition between large grocery retailers and other convenience store operators ... is not causing a broad-based decline in convenience store numbers or revenues, including the number or revenues of independent non-affiliated and symbol group convenience stores'' (Competition Commission, 2008, page 88) .
In this paper we assess one of the critical pieces of research undertaken by the Commission which underpinned its findings. We then outline a parallel study commissioned by one of the main parties to the Inquiry and conducted by the University of Southampton. Part of that study is already in the public domain and available via the Competition Commission. However, this paper releases for the first time the University of Southampton's reanalysis of the Commission's so-called`conditional entry analysis'öan extremely important component of the Commission's research which focused directly on the extent to which entry into the small and specialist store sector might be constrained by, and exit from the sector accelerated by, the competitive impacts of the major corporate retailers. We show that our national-level baseline conditional entry analysis findings essentially corroborate those of the Commission. However, we then go on to demonstrate that these findings can be usefully extended if a regional dimension is introduced into the analysis. In particular, we show that very different patterns of net entry and exit into the small and specialist store sector appear to have operated during the early to mid 2000s within a set of Office for National Statistics (ONS) groupings of local authorities which together define`London and Prospering Southern England'öthat is to say in what might be termed`high-growth Britain', compared with elsewhere in the country. We believe that these are important findings which enrich the Competition Commission's research and have potential policy implicationsönot least in the context of the proposed changes to Planning Policy Statement 6 (PPS6) released for consultation by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) in July 2008. Our paper concludes with a brief discussion of those policy implications.
The Competition Commission's small stores working paper Of crucial importanceöalbeit as the Chairman of the Competition Commission has subsequently stressed, only one of several equally important strands of evidence taken into account by the Commission in reaching its provisional findings öwas the investigation by the Commission's own economists of competitive conditions in the small store sector across more than one thousand UK town centres and high streets covered by the annual or biennial retail surveys and datasets compiled by Experian Goad. The Commission's analysis of those data over the period 1999/2000 to 2005/06 was released as a Working Paper on Entry and Exit of Small and Specialist Stores in June 2007 (Competition Commission, 2007b) , and subsequent references refer to paragraphs in that working paper.
The paper contained three distinct strands of analysis and evidence.
(1) The first component provided an analysis of the trends in small store numbers over time, and the entry and exit rates by retail type. Here the Commission found the specialist small shops (fishmongers, greengrocers, butchers, bakers, off-licences) to be in long-term decline. However, it found evidence (paragraphs 8 and 9) of continued new entry, suggestive of a``lack of prohibitive barriers to entry'' and the possibility of`n ew specialist stores opening where sufficient demand for such stores exists''. It also found evidence that the decline in specialist stores had become proportionally smaller over timeöthat is to say, evidence``not consistent with the argument that a decline in the high street was gathering pace'' (paragraph 8). Furthermore, in the case of small stores in some retail categoriesöhealth food shops, delicatessens, and, most notably, convenience storesöthe Commission found evidence of robust growth. In particular, and contrary to the evidence provided by the ACS, nonaffiliated independent convenience stores were found to be growing strongly in the large sample of town centres and high streets covered by Experian Goad, with significant net entry being recorded in each of the years 2000 to 2006. Indeed, the total number of independent convenience stores in the 1115 town centres and high streets covered by the Experian Goad data had increased by no less than 77% between 2000 and 2006.
As the Commission acknowledged, the number of convenience stores within the Experian Goad surveyed centres and high streets accounted for only a small minority of the national stock of convenience stores. As such, it was possible that different trends might be operating in those centres and high streets than elsewhere in the country (eg in small parades of urban stores or isolated shops in villages and estates). Nevertheless, the Commission was not convinced that explanation fully accounted for the discrepancy between its findings and those of the ACS (paragraph 15). Instead, the Commission suggested that what might be flawed were the data-collection methods employed by the publisher William Reed (referred to as the`Knowledge Store') and used by the Institute of Grocery Distribution to provide the evidence on trends in independent convenience store numbers which underpinned the original ACS submission to OFT. In particular, the Commission suggested that those data-collection methods might be``missing a significant number of entries into the convenience store sector'' (paragraph 15).
That interpretation subsequently became a matter of heated dispute between the ACS and the Commission. [See Guy (2008) for a useful initial commentary on the issues; also Appendix 5.1, Annex 1 of the Commission's Final Report (Competition Commission, 2008, A5 (1) 8^18) for the Commission's subsequent detailed assessment and responses to ACS submissions on the issue.] However, in its Provisional Findings, the Commissionörevealing that it had additionally drawn on data on trends in convenience store numbers provided by the Office for National Statistics, which also implied increases in convenience store numbers over the period 2000 (Competition Commission, 2007a , page 150) ö reiterated its concern that the Knowledge Store database``potentially misses some new non-affiliated independent convenience stores that enter the sector'' [page A5(3) 7]. It also reiterated its view that,``given the data collection methodology employed by Goad, we are confident that its dataset is robust'' [page A5(3) 7]. It concluded, therefore, that``at least in some areas of the UK it appears that there is strong growth in both non-affiliated independent and multiple and symbol convenience stores'' [page A5(3) 6]öa conclusion which the Commission acknowledged was in marked``contrast to a widely-held view that there is broad-based decline of the convenience store sector across the UK'' [Competition Commission, 2007a, pages A5(3) 6^8].
It is not our purpose in this paper to comment on the dispute between the Commission and ACS regarding the limitations of the Knowledge Store and Goad data. We merely note the Commission's continued expressions of confidence in the robustness of the Goad database [Competition Commission, 2008 , A5(2)-9]öa database which also provides the empirical basis of the analysis we present in this paper.
(2) The second component of the Commission's working paper provided a so-called`conditional entry analysis' in which the entry and exit rates of particular categories of small and specialist stores in town centres and high streets which had experienced the competitive opening of a supermarket (above 15 000 ft 2 , 1400 m 2 ) during 1999/2000 to 2005/06 were compared with the entry and exit rates of similar small stores in a control group of centres and high streets unaffected by a supermarket opening in that period. In terms of its potential policy implications, this analysis was extremely important as it focused directly on the extent to which entry into the small and specialist store sector might be constrained by, and exit from the sector accelerated by, the competitive impacts of the major corporate food retailers. The conclusions of the analysis were that some categories of small and specialist stores (greengrocers, fishmongers, off-licences, and independent music and video stores öwith the last two categories showing the impact only since 2002) had been negatively impacted during the period by the opening of a supermarketöwhilst, in contrast, other categories of stores (bakers, health food shops, and independent convenience stores) had been positively impacted. In the case of a significant number of store categories [including butchers, CTNs (confectionists/tobacconists/newsagents), delicatessens, and independent booksellers], however, together with local (street and farmers') markets, no clear pattern of negative or positive impact could be observed. As this component of the Competition Commission's analysis provides the base for what we argue is the more refined and revealing extended conditional entry analysis provided in this paper, we leave further discussion of these results until later in the paper.
(3) The third component of the Commission's working paper provided an econometric version of the previous graphical conditional entry analysis. The base model estimated took the form
where NEx% it represents the net exit rate of a specific category of small or specialist store in town centre or high street i at time t, A i is the location-specific fixed effect for each town centre/high street, T is a time trend, SUPENT it represents the opening of a supermarket in the town centre or high street i at time t, and TMS it represents the appearance of a convenience store with a Sainsbury, Tesco, or Marks & Spencer fascia in centre/high street i. This base model was subsequently refined to take account of whether the supermarket opening took place in the town centre, at the edge of the town centre, or in an out-of-centre location.
The conclusions drawn from the econometric modelling (Competition Commission, 2007b, paragraphs 35, 36) were that the opening of a new larger format supermarket in or near a town centre or high street increased the net exit rate of greengrocers, fishmongers, off-licences, independent booksellers, and local markets, but reduced the net exit rate of (that is, had a positive impact on) bakers and convenience stores. Additionally, the growth of independent convenience stores was found to be accelerated by supermarkets opening on edge-of-centre sites rather than in town centres, suggesting`t hat, for many consumers, convenience stores constitute a complementary service to that of large supermarkets'' (paragraph 36).
Subsequently, and as reported in both the Provisional Findings and Final Reports, the Commission changed the specification of the base model slightly to include a location-specific time trend (AT it ). That is to say, the base model was modified to a form the Commission [2007a, A5(3)-13] describes as
where AT it is the time trend for each location. (2) It is important to note, however, that employing this specification with its block of location-specific time trends changed the conclusions the Commission drew relative to those it had suggested in the working paper. The conclusions from the revised specification were significantly more conservative, suggesting only that the opening of a new larger format supermarket in or near a town centre or high street increased the net exit rate of (that is, had a negative impact on) greengrocers and local markets (that is, street and farmers markets) and, conversely, reduced the net exit rate of (that is, had a positive impact on) bakers [Competition Commission, 2007a, A5(3)-14] . On the basis of the revised specification, all other types of small and specialist stores studied by the Commission were placed into the`no identifiable effect' category.
Although we acknowledge their importance, we note that these econometric findings of the Commission are dependent on the incorporation/estimation of very large numbers of location-specific-effect parameters. This effectively`washes out' and potentially obscures important geographical dimensions of the competitive impacts of larger format corporate foodstore openings on the small store sector. In particular, it is our belief that these econometric findings of the Commission have the capacity to be enriched by injecting into the specifications of the model the regional-level structures which we propose in later sections of the paper. In this paper we choose to demonstrate that potential enrichment, and to illustrate the importance of those missing regional-level structures via an extension of the basic graphical conditional entry analysis component of the Commission's research. We leave extension of the Commission's econometric findings to future research. (3) The University of Southampton studies A number of the main and third parties to the Inquiry commissioned additional research both from UK universities and from economic consultancy firms to supplement their in-house capabilities. (4) In a similar fashion to the studies commissioned by the ACS, in May 2007 Tesco commissioned the University of Southampton's GeoData (2) We take it, however, that a more precise statement of this specification should have d indexed by i (d i ) to reflect the fact that a set of multiplicative fixed-location-effect6time parameters require estimating, one for each location i. The result of including these location-specific time-trend terms in the revised specification is seen in the substantially raised R 2 -values reported for the revised specification. However, that increase is clearly a function of, and is obtained at the cost of, significantly increasing the number of parameters estimated in the model. (4) For example, the ACS commissioned work by Professor Paul Dobson of Loughborough University on``micro marketing and discriminatory practices in UK grocery retailing'' (http://www.competitioncommission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2006/grocery/pdf/main party submission acs micro marketing.pdf ) and Professor Roman Inderst of the LSE and Europe Economics to develop a formal model of how the so-called`waterbed effect' of corporate retail/buyer power might work in theory and result in a detriment to consumers (http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2006/grocery/pdf/ main party submissions acs waterbed effect.pdf).
Institute to conduct a parallel analysis of the Experian Goad data focused on retail change between 2000 and 2006 across a consistent set of 1092 UK town centres and high streets. The University of Southampton team were unaware that the Commission was conducting similar research until the Commission released its working paper on 11 June 2007.
The first component of the Southampton research focused, like that of the Commission, on trends in small store numbers over time and entry and exit rates by store category. In particular, it analysed changes in convenience store numbersö corroborating the Commission's findings, but also incorporating some important methodological enhancements to the Commission's analysis.
Most significantly, the Southampton research separated out changes in convenience store numbers which may have arisen as a result of the fact that the Experian Goad shopping centre plans have, as the Commission's working paper (2007b, paragraph 4) notes,``no fixed size in geographic terms''. That is to say, the boundaries of the shopping areas in the town centres and high streets surveyed by Experian Goad are allowed to expand or contract over time (from survey to survey), as deemed appropriate by the Goad surveyors. Holding these boundaries constant over the analysis period öthat is to say, calculating change within the fixed boundaries of the centres as defined at the start of the period (in 2000)öallowed the definition of what might be termed the likefor-like increases/decreases in convenience store numbers, and therefore, importantly, to confirm that the findings of the Commission were not merely an artefact of changing shopping centre size.
On a like-for-like basis, convenience stores in the 1092 town centres and high streets were found to have increased by 70.4% between 2000 and 2006öwith the majority (56.9%) of the total like-for-like increase being accounted for by nonaffiliated independent retailers.
A second significant element of the Southampton research was the provision of a regional breakdown of the overall growth trend in convenience store numbers identified by the Commission. On a like-for-like basis, a majority (56%) of the growth was found to have occurred in London and the South East and, within London, a large majority (78.5%) of that growth was accounted for by the increase in nonaffiliated independent convenience stores.
A full account of the first component of the Southampton research was provided to the Competition Commission in August 2007 and made available for public discussion by the Commission via its Inquiry website: http://www. competition-commission.org.uk/ inquiries/ref2006/grocery/pdf/third party submissions other org prof neil wrigley no3.pdf). A one-page pre¨cis of the findings was published in the New Statesman 8 October 2007 (special supplement on``The Future of the High Street'', page 8), and the work is summarised by the Competition Commission both in its Provisional Findings and its Final Reports (Competition Commission, 2007a, Appendix 5.3, 18^19; 2008, Appendix 5.2, 9) .
In this paper we now proceed to report the second component of the University of Southampton researchöfocused, like that of the Commission, on a conditional entry analysis. It is important to note, however, that, whereas the Commission was able to construct the database of supermarket openings 1999/2000 to 2005/2006 which it used in its conditional entry analysis from confidential submissions provided by each of the major grocery retailers operating in the UK, the Southampton research had to proxy the Commission's data file using a Tesco-supplied listing both of its own and of competitor store openings during that period. Nevertheless, we are confident that the Tesco-supplied`supermarket openings' data file is robust and, indeed, is of the highest possible quality given its significant commercial value to the UK market leader.
Within this`supermarket openings' data file, an`opening' was defined as any store exceeding 15 000 ft 2 (1400 m 2 ) opening within the period 1999/2000 to October 2005 within 10 km of a Goad-surveyed town centre/high street. That is to say, it included out-of-centre, edge-of-centre, and in-centre supermarket openings. Cases involving simple`rebadging' of an existing supermarket following acquisition by another corporate retailer were excluded from the list of openings, with the exception of six Tesco stores acquired from the Co-op which involved major renovation equivalent to the development of a new store. In total 303`supermarket openings' were identified during the analysis period, spread over 266 Goad-surveyed town centres and high streetsö 29 of those centres/high streets experiencing more than one supermarket opening. In contrast, 826 Goad-surveyed centres and high streets experienced no`supermarket opening' during the analysis period and thus represented the`control group' of centres in the subsequent analysis.
A heuristic to aid understanding of the conditional entry analysis Although considerably more complex than figure 1, given they provide net exit rates on a yearly basis between 1999/2000 and 2005/06 for each category of small and specialist store, it is possible to summarise the Competition Commission's conditional entry analysis diagrams using the simple heuristic in figure 1. Reading from the left in the top half of figure 1, negative impacts associated with supermarket opening are suggested by the following patterns:
. That shown in figure 1(a) where higher net exit rates (defined as the exit rate minus the entry rate) occur in the centres which have experienced supermarket opening than in the control group of centres not affected by supermarket opening. . That shown in figure 1(b) , where net exit is recorded in the centres which have experienced supermarket opening whilst, in contrast, net entry (ie negative net exit) is recorded in the control group. . That shown in figure 1(c) where net entry levels are lower in the centres which have experienced supermarket opening compared with the levels recorded in the control group. In contrast, reading from the left in the bottom half of figure 1, positive impacts associated with supermarket opening are suggested by the following patterns:
. That shown in figure 1(d), where lower net exit rates occur in the centres which have experienced supermarket opening compared with the control group of centres not affected by supermarket opening. . That shown in figure 1(e), where net entry is recorded in the centres which have experienced supermarket opening whilst, in contrast, net exit is recorded in the control group. . That shown in figure 1(f ) where net entry levels are higher in the centres which have experienced supermarket opening compared to the levels recorded in the control group. Inevitably, given that it relied on a supermarkets openings data file which, by default, differed slightly from that used by the Commission, the national-level Southampton analysis could be expected to produce slightly different results. In practice, however, those findings calculated on either a fixed-boundaries (like-for-like) basis, or allowing boundaries of the shopping areas of the town centres/high streets to vary over time, were very similar. The majority of store types (eight of eleven categories considered) fell into exactly the same competitive impact grouping as found by the Commission: greengrocers, fishmongers, off-licences, and independent music and video stores showed negative competitive impacts from supermarket openings, bakers and convenience stores showed positive competitive impacts; and no clear pattern of negative or positive impacts was observed in the case of CTNs and independent booksellers.
(5) Local markets were also placed into the`no clear pattern' category, but we choose not to consider this element of the small store sector further because of our concerns about sample size issues in our subsequent regional analysis.
The other three types of small store experienced minor shifts in competitive impact grouping compared with that found in the Commission's analysis. Health food shopsö although showing, as in the Commission's analysis, high levels of growth and net entry ö were less firmly in the positive competitive impact group and were more appropriately placed in the`no clear pattern' group, whereas butchers and delicatessens shifted from the`no clear pattern' group to the negative competitive impact group.
At a national level therefore, despite variation which inevitably arises from relying on slightly different`supermarket openings' data files, the picture then is one of broad and reassuring comparability between the findings of the Competition Commission and Southampton conditional entry analysis, with almost 75% of small store types being placed into the same competitive impact groups, and with the remaining small store types shifting only marginally. Moreover, and importantly, it is also clear that the Tesco-supplied`supermarket openings' data file used in the Southampton analysis had not been constructed in such a way that it would produce a more`positive' interpretation of the competitive impacts of supermarket openings on the small store sector than that employed by the Commission. Rather, the Tesco-supplied data file used in the Southampton analysis produced a slightly more negative national-level baseline against which to assess the implications of introducing a regional dimension into the analysis, and it is important to keep this in mind when assessing the findings outlined in the next section.
It is to the findings of that regionally structured analysis of the conditional entry analysis that we now turn.
Comparing the competitive impacts of supermarket opening on entry and exit of small stores in London and Prospering Southern England versus the rest of the UK As noted above, an important conclusion of the first component of the Southampton research was that the majority of the growth in convenience store numbers between 2000 and 2006 had occurred in London and the South East. A similar regional structure was therefore introduced into the conditional entry analysis. However, in this case, rather than using the rather crude`standard region' categorisation which had been adopted in that component of the earlier research, the more refined and widely adopted ONS 2001 area classification of local authorities at group level (ONS, 2003) was used to separate out (see figure 2 ) an area which we define as`London and Prospering Southern England' from the rest of the UK. In other words, an analysis was undertaken of whether significantly different patterns of net entry and exit into the small and specialist store sector were operating in what during the early to mid 2000s was the`high-growth Britain' region of southern England compared with elsewhere in the country. As figure 2 shows, this region stretches westwards and southwestwards down the M4 and M3 corridors, includes the M11 corridor, and encompasses 21% of the UK's population. The results of this analysis, which are presented below, suggest that this regionally structured conditional entry analysis provides added value.
To appreciate the detailed findings of this analysis, which are presented in figure 4 , it is appropriate to begin, in figure 3(a) , with the exemplar store category of butchers ö recalling that this category was placed by the Competition Commission's analysis in the`no clear pattern' of negative or positive impacts associated with supermarket opening grouping. Using the heuristic provided in figure 1 to guide interpretation, it can be seen that in London and Prospering Southern England, butchers show lower net exit rates in the town centres/high streets that have experienced supermarket openings ö that is to say, positive impacts associated with supermarket openings. In contrast, elsewhere in the UK, butchers show higher net exit rates in centres/high streets that have experienced supermarket openings ö that is to say, negative impacts associated with supermarket openings. Introducing a regional component into the conditional entry analysis has therefore allowed the indeterminate/`no clear pattern' finding of the Commission to be resolved into two distinctly different patterns of impact in the two parts of the UK. Likewise, in figure 3(b), we show equivalent findings for the store category`delicatessens'öanother category placed by the Commission's analysis into the`no clear pattern' of negative or positive impact associated with supermarket opening grouping. Here it can be seen that in London and Prospering Southern England, delicatessens show high levels of net entry in all circumstances. However, in the group of town centres/high streets experiencing competitive supermarket openings, net entry rates are significantly higher than in the`no opening' group of centres/high streets indicating positive impacts associated with supermarket openings. In contrast, in the rest of the UK, net exit of delicatessens is seen in the centres/high streets experiencing supermarket openings, but net entry is seen in the`no opening' group ösuggesting negative impacts associated with supermarket openings. Once again, introducing a regional component into the analysis has allowed the`no clear pattern' findings of the Commission to be resolved into two distinctly different patterns of impact in the two parts of the UK.
In both cases (butchers and delicatessens) the findings presented are on the`fixed boundaries' like-for-like basis discussed above. Allowing the boundaries of the shopping areas in the town centres/high streets surveyed by Goad to expand or contract over time (as in the Competition Commission's analysis) produces findings which differ only in numeric terms, not in a substantive/interperative sense. Figure 4 shows, on a fixed boundaries (like-for-like) basis, the findings for all eleven categories of small and specialist stores discussed above, and table 1 summarises those findings. Set within the context of continued long-term decline of specialist small stores noted above, three aspects of the results stand out. (6) (1) Significantly different exit and entry conditions appear to have operated (2000^06) in London and Prospering Southern England. In that region a large majority (eight of eleven of the categories of small stores studied, ranging from fishmongers through independent music and video stores to independent convenience stores), show evidence of positive impacts associated with supermarket opening. That is to say, eight of eleven categories show net entry of small and specialised stores being accelerated by, or net exit being restrained by, the competitive opening of a supermarket (15 000 ft 2 and above). This contrasts with the Competition Commission's non-regionallysegmented analysis, in which only three of eleven categories of small stores (bakers, health food shops, and independent convenience stores) showed similar evidence of positive impact. Echoing the Commission's words in the context of the finding of strong growth in independent convenience stores in the Goad-surveyed town centres and high streets, this finding will appear to be in`marked contrast`to a widely held public perception [fuelled perhaps by the NEFs`clone town' thesis (2005)] that corporate supermarket openings have had particularly detrimental impacts on the diversity of small stores within the high streets of southern England. Rather, the evidence in figure 4 and table 1 suggests that in the period 2000^06 the opposite may have been the case. A large majority of categories of small and specialist stores in this region of the UK show evidence of positive impacts associated with supermarket openings, and only greengrocers and off-licences reveal evidence of negative impact.
(2) There are far fewer categories of store which must be placed in the indeterminatè no clear pattern' category than suggested by the Commission's non-regionally-segmented analysis. Only independent booksellers of the categories of store suggested by the Commission fall unambiguously into this grouping.
(6) A referee of our original paper suggested that we examine the impact on our results of setting the`margin of error' in table 1 at a variable rate across the small store categories, rather than at the uniform 3% used in the table. What that would mean is that for each category of small store and for each of the two regions, we would first establish the difference in the net exit rates shown in figure 4 between centres/high streets experiencing supermarket openings and those unaffected by supermarket openings, and then compare that difference to a critical`margin of error' value defined as say 5%, 10%, or 15% of the larger of the two net exit rates for that type of store in that region. For example, in the case of off-licences, and using 10% as the`margin of error' we would compare the difference in the net exit rates (25X9 À 21X7 4X2) in`London and Prospering Southern England' against a margin of error defined as 10% of 25.9 (2.59) and would compare the difference in the net exit rates (28X5 À 18X2 10X3) in the`Rest of the UK' against a margin of error defined as 10% of 28.5 (2.85). In both cases the differences exceed the margin of error, indicating that the`impact' categories that store type has been assigned to in table 1 are reasonable. If we adopt this variable scale-related`margin of error' approach, our findings (summarised in table 1) remain substantially the same. Using a 5% scale-related`margin of error', for example, the only change in table 1 is that bakers in the`Rest of the UK' fall unambiguously into the`positive impact associated with supermarket opening' category. With a 10% scale-related`margin of error', bakers in the`Rest of the UK' remain in the`positive impact' category and independent convenience stores in`London and Prospering Southern England' (albeit rather marginally) might now be placed in the`no clear evidence' category.
So, whilst we accept the truism that our findings are`margin of error' dependent, and accept the argument that the`margin of error' in table 1 might more appropriately be defined on a variable/scale-related basis, it is clear that on such a basis the`margin of error' would have to be set at an unreasonably high level (20% and above) to change the substantive nature of our conclusionsöie, to shift the findings summarised in table 1 significantly towards those produced by the Commission's non-regionally-segmented analysis. The same arguments also apply to table 2.
(3) Outside London and Prospering Southern England there are, conversely, slightly more categories of small stores (seven out of eleven) than suggested by the Commission's analysis where competitive supermarket opening is associated with negative impacts (butchers, delicatessens, and health food shops join the Commission's list).
In assessing these findings it is important to note two issues. First, that this is an analysis solely of the net entry/exit balance within categories of small stores across two groups of UK towns centres and high streetsöa group of centres/high streets that had experienced the competitive opening of a supermarket during the period 2000^06 versus a group unaffected by a supermarket opening during that period. That is to say, the analysis focuses solely on the extent to which entry into parts of the small store sector during that period might have been constrained by, and/or exit accelerated by, the competitive impact of supermarket openings. It must be understood, therefore, that it is possible (as suggested by figure 4) to find simultaneously that: (i) some categories of small storesöfor example, butchers, bakers, CTNs, independent music and video, and fishmongers öexperienced a continuation, during 2000^06, of long-term patterns of decline, whilst at the same time finding (ii) no evidence to support the view that these types of small store were negatively impacted by competitive supermarket openings öin the sense of their entry being differentially constrained by, and/or exit being accelerated by those openings. Second, it is vital to stress that in reporting positive or negative`impacts' associated with supermarket openings, we are not intending to suggest any causality. It is important to stress that what the findings provide is evidence of positive or negative`associations' between entry/exit conditions and competitive supermarket opening. And, in this context, there are several possible explanations which can be advanced for the positive associations found in London and Prospering Southern England during 2000^06önot all of which imply any direct or indirect causal linkage. (7) Those explanations include; (1) The possibility that the opening of a supermarket draws more people into the town centre or high street and that this helps underpin the small stores by generating both urban`buzz' (Storper and Venables, 2004) and positive spillover effects via the well-known`linked trips' hypothesis espoused by urban planners. In this context, new empirical evidence from a large-scale UK study (Wrigley et al, 2009) suggests that linked trips generated by such supermarket openings may be of a higher level than previously suggested. (2) The possibility that the opening of an`in-centre' or`edge-of-centre' supermarket might accelerate the exit of small stores from other more isolated/peripheral elements of the retail system (small parades, isolated shops, etc) as former customers of those stores switch to using small stores in the town centre/high street as a result of`linked trip' behaviour. (3) The`noncausal linkage' possibility that growth of population and household income in the catchment area of the town centre/high street might simultaneously result in both: (a) new supermarket development, and (b) increased trade for small stores in the centre/high street sufficient to encourage new entry or slow exit. [An alternative version of this explanation might place more emphasis on populationcomposition change (the shifting nature of demand) in the catchment area of the centre/high street rather than simply population/income increase (demand growth) per se.]
Although the first two of these possible explanations would require additional evidence from in-depth consumer-survey research for adequate assessment, some insights into the third explanation are possible from the Experian Goad data. In this context, we note evidence of significant increases during 2000^06 in some categories of small stores (in particular, independent convenience stores) in town centres/high streets in London and Prospering Southern England whose catchment areas had experienced population growth above the national average for that period. However, we also observe similar increases among town centres/high streets with more slowly growing catchment areas that were simultaneously experiencing population-composition change in terms of increasing ethnic diversityöfor example, increases in independent convenience stores linked to catchment-area expansion of Central/Eastern European, Asian, and other groups, what Guy (2008) refers to as the`Polish grocer' effect.
Increasing the complexity of the regional segmentation Having established that markedly different competitive impacts on the small and specialist store sector associated with supermarket opening appear to have operated during the period 2000^06 in`high-growth Britain' than elsewhere in the country, the complexity of the regional segmentation in the analysis was next increased. In this analysis, the ONS classification of local authorities at group level was used to separate out (see figure 5) what ONS refers to as`Prospering Smaller Towns', from`London and Prospering Southern England' and the rest of the UK. As figure 5 shows,`Prospering (7) We are grateful to a referee of the original version of this paper both for suggesting and for helping us clarify these possibilities. Smaller Towns'öa category which includes 21.6% of the UK's populationöencompasses a wide range of the smaller towns and more rural/semirural local authorities surrounding high-growth' London and Prospering Southern England, together with similar authorities surrounding the major conurbations of the Midlands and northern England. It also includes areas adjacent to Glasgow and Belfast. As a result, it is a rather heterogeneous regional division only loosely described by its`Prospering Smaller Towns' ONS label. Nevertheless, the issue is the extent to which competitive impacts of supermarket openings in this somewhat heterogeneous region had more in common with those in London and Prospering Southern England during 2000-06 than with those elsewhere in the UK. As table 2 shows, the evidence tends towards that conclusion. In the`Prospering Smaller Towns' region, six out of eleven of the categories of small stores show evidence of net entry being differentially accelerated in, and/or net exit constrained in, centres/ high streets experiencing supermarket openings öthat is to say, of positive impacts associated with supermarket openings. Although slightly fewer than the eight out of eleven categories recorded in London and Prospering Southern England, this figure is significantly greater than the three out of eleven categories (bakers, health food shops, and independent convenience stores) for which the Commission's non-regionallysegmented analysis found similar evidence. However, the heterogeneity of the`Prospering Smaller Towns' regional division must be stressed. As a result, it is important to note that, in contrast to what we believe is the robust finding that markedly different competitive impact conditions operated in London and Prospering Southern England, the findings in table 2 are merely suggestive and exploratory. They are indicative of a greater similarity in these areas of the UK to the competitive impact conditions observed in Prospering Southern England than to conditions in the remainder of the UK, but there is a need for further more detailed analysis.
Discussion ö an inconvenient truth and its implications for the proposed changes to Planning Policy Statement 6 (PPS6) The Competition Commission's working paper on entry and exit of small and specialist stores provided a landmark piece of research on a topic in which debate and policy recommendations had moved significantly and, arguably, dangerously, ahead of the available evidence base. Into highly charged and polarised debates, frequently characterised by the recycling of ill-digested, poorly substantiated, and often rather dated factoids' (8) which had come to assume the status of`truth', (9) the Commission injected a piece of high-quality, reproducible, and potentially refutable empirical evidence. Despite there being issues relating to the extent of coverage of the national stock of convenience stores within the Experian Goad dataset, and the possibility that the town centres and high streets surveyed by Goad may have been more able, as Guy (2008) explains, to maintain or improve their retail offer and attract new entrants than other more peripheral/isolated elements of the retail system, the Commission's analysis was, at the very least, able to throw considerable doubt on some popular myths. In particular, within the general context of a continuing long-term decline of specialist small stores in British town centres and high streets, it was able to cast doubt on the view that a broad-based decline of the independent convenience store sector was taking place across the UK. It also cast doubt on the view that Britain's high streets were experiencing an accelerating decline in their small and specialist stores. Instead, it was able to demonstrate that in some parts of the UK strong growth and net new entry was being experienced by elements of the small store sector including, but not confined to, independent convenience stores. Significantly, the Commission's findings that an increase of more than 70% in independent convenience store numbers had taken place between 2000 and 2006 across the Goad-surveyed town centres and high streets was corroborated and shown not to be an artefact of changing shopping centre/high street boundaries (ie size) by the first element of the University of Southampton's parallel study.
(8) In the context of the metaphor of the`food desert' (Wrigley, 2002) and similar arguments about the need for evidence-based assessment, Cummins and Macintyre (2002) describe a`factoid' as an assumption reported and repeated so often that it becomes an imagined fact. (9) Classic examples of this relate to the conclusions of the DETR's (1998) influential report on The Impact of Large Foodstores on Market Towns and District Centres. Despite a prevailing view among academics that the findings of the DETR report in relation to the impact of edge-of-centre foodstore developments tended to considerable``ambiguity in detail'' (Thomas and Bromley, 2003, page 56) , and that the only reasonable conclusion was that they left in dispute whether edge-ofcentre foodstore developments``enhance the attractiveness of the centre, compete with existing facilities, or are completely neutral'' (page 55), the headline findings from one of the DETR's case studies have subsequently been overgeneralised, and frequently incorrectly interpreted and cited as providing definitive evidence that``more supermarkets result in fewer independent shops'' (CPRE, 2006, page 6).
Finally, and even more controversially, the Commission's analysis was able to demonstrate that competitive supermarket entry was not inevitably and uniformly associated with negative impacts on the small store sector. In this context, two points must be stressed. First, the Commission's highly significant findings on competitive supermarket entry impacts are based, in the case of several categories of small stores, on Experian Goad coverage levels of the national stock of small stores which are significantly greater than in the case of independent convenience stores. For example, whereas less than 5% of the national stock of independent convenience stores were located during this period in the Goad-surveyed town centres and high streets, it is possible to calculate from the ONS Annual Business Inquiry statistics, that approximately 25% of butchers and fishmongers were located in the Goad-surveyed centres and high streets and more than 60% of bakers and confectioners. Second, it is important not to misinterpret these findings as relating to the impacts associated with`big box' out-ofcentre supermarket openings. The Commission's threshold size (15 000 ft 2 ) definition for à supermarket opening' is well below that typical of`big box' out-of-centre development, and the supermarket openings which it analysed clearly include large numbers of the smaller flexible (`planning regulation friendly') stores developed by the major retailers both in edge-of-centre and in-centre locations in response to a decade of tightening retail planning regulation (PPG6/PPS6 and the sequential test)
In this paper we attempt to build on both the spirit and the substance of the Commission's research. We suggest that it is both possible, and potentially important in policy terms, to inject into the Commission's analysis a regional segmentation. In particular, we provide evidence that entry and exit into and from the small and specialist store sector in the UK during the period 2000^2006 was constrained and/or accelerated by the competitive impact of supermarket opening in a markedly different fashion within a set of ONS groupings of local authorities which together definè London and Prospering Southern England' than elsewhere in the country. In the Goad-surveyed town centres and high streets in that region, not only was competitive supermarket entry not inevitably associated with negative impacts on the small store sector (as per the Commission's analysis), but rather it appears that for a large majority of small-store types this association was positive. That is to say, in town centres/high streets in the region which experienced competitive supermarket openings net exit rates were lower and/or net entry rates were higher for bakers, butchers, CTNs, delicatessens, fishmongers, health food shops, independent music and video shops, and independent convenience stores than in centres/high streets unaffected by supermarket openings. It was only in the case of greengrocers and off-licences that the associations with supermarket openings were consistently negative.
We note that this is not the only study to report more positive associations between supermarket development and small store prospects than suggested by the Competition Commission's analysis. Recent research by Sadun (2008a; 2008b) for the Centre for Economic Performance has considered the relationship between retail employment growth of small independent retailers in UK local authorities and the number of retail development applications granted for stores over 1000 m 2 within each of those authorities during the period 1998^2004. Her`counterintuitive' finding is that there is a positive relationship between employment growth in small independent retailers and the number of larger store retail developments approved, and she draws attention to similar findings obtained in France and Italy by Betrand and Kramarz (2002) and Viviano (2008) . We do not endorse her subsequent preferred explanation of this resultöwe leave that discussion for another paper. Additionally, we believe that it stretches credibility to say that her work explores the`interactions between big-boxes and independent stores' (Sadun, 2008a, page 6, our emphasis) given that it examines retail developments which exceed a threshold considerably below even the modest 15 000 ft 2 (1400 m 2 ) used by the Competition Commission and ourselves. Nevertheless, it is important to note the existence of other research both in the UK and in continental Europe which raises the possibility of positive associations between`larger' format corporate retail entry and small store prospects.
What, then, are the policy implications of our findings? Two issues would appear to stand out. First, our findings have clear significance for a part of the UK (Prospering Southern England) which from as far back as the late 1980s/early 1990s has become an increasingly contested terrain in terms of the food store development process. Indeed, in the final years of the then Conservative Government, it was growing opposition to`greenfield' out-of-town retail development in this region which was instrumental in the development of PPG6 and the initial towns centres first' policies championed by the then Secretary of State, John Gummer (Guy, 2006; Wrigley, 1998a; 1998b) . In the period since 2000 it has also been the region in which arguments about the threat of corporate retail to the diversity of the small store sector and attempts to`lock out' further corporate food store development from town centres and high streets have taken root most strongly. For example, in its Clone Towns report, the NEF (2005, page 25) drew attention to a process which it claimed Parisian councillors refer to as``la Londonisation'' öthe loss of retail diversity and a sustainable range of essential local shops öand advocated the use of Section 106 planning powers to place obligations on retail developments to promote diversity of use. It is ironic, therefore, that it is the small shops in the town centres and high streets of this very region of the UK which are shown by the analysis in this paper to have been most robust to competitive supermarket opening in the early to mid 2000s. To that extent, therefore, our findings represent an`inconvenient truth' which requires urgent consideration in policy debate. Furthermore, there is some evidence that this robustness might also have extendedöalbeit to a lesser degreeöto an increasingly equally contested encircling periphery of`Prospering Smaller Towns' outside the region. Again, many of these`Prospering Smaller Towns' had become the focus of attempts by organisations such as the CPRE to equate their vitality and sustainable development with the extra value provided by small, independent, and genuinely local shops, and to argue that`locking out' corporate foodstore development would protect the local food economy (CPRE, 2006) .
Once again, however, it is important to stress that these conclusions must not be over-interpreted as implying a robustness to the competitive opening of large-format big box' out-of-centre stores. The 303 supermarket openings analysed in drawing out our findings included 48% of cases that were PPG6/sequential-test-responsive, typically smaller format, stores in edge-of-centre and in-centre locations. Alternatively, expressed in terms of the 266 towns centres and high streets that had experienced a supermarket opening during the analysis period, in 53% of those cases that opening had involved a`planning regulation friendly' edge-of-centre or in-centre development.
Second, we suggest that our findings also merit consideration within the context of planning regulation reform. In particular, they provide relevant evidence in the context of the proposed changes to Planning Policy Statement 6 (PPS6) Planning for Town Centres released for consultation by the DCLG in July 2008 (DCLG, 2008) . (10) Within that consultation document it was proposedöfollowing the recommendations of the Barker Report (HM Treasury, 2006) , and as signalled in the Planning White Paper of 2007
Planning for a Sustainable Future (HM Government, 2007)öto replace the existing need' and`impact' tests, which apply to the assessment of retail development, with a new`strengthened impact test'. The proposed new test öthe practice guidance details of which were not released with the consultation document (11) öwill attempt to take into account the recommendations of the Competition Commission's Inquiry, remove the restrictions on market entry and competition which the Barker Report had argued was the unintended consequence of the existing`need' test, and reflect the inclusion in the proposed revisions to PPS6 of promotion of competition between retailers as one of the government's key objectives for town centres. In particular, it was proposed that future retail development proposals should be``assessed on the extent to which they promote consumer choice and retail diversity'' (DCLG, 2008, page 5) , and that local authorities will be required to``proactively use the planning process to support the diversification of uses in the town centre'', promoting``competitive town centre environments'' (pages 17^18).
Although the proposed revisions to PPS6 recognised that``larger retail stores can strengthen a centre's retail offer and perform an important anchor role, increas [ing] linked trips and pedestrian activity'' (DCLG, 2008, page 17) , it is clear that the government expects that the strengthened impact test will offer``better protection to the high street and small shops'' (page 42), and that local authorities should judge retail development proposals on the extent to which they support a``good mix of shops and services'' (page 17) and promote competition in the town centre. How this was to be achieved in practice, the extent to which it might mesh into any formal competition test subsequently introduced as the result of the Competition Commission's Inquiry, (12) and the extent to which it would be`fascia blind' in line with current and past planning policy principles, had yet to be clarified at the time of writing this paper. Nevertheless, in determining the level of protection to be incorporated into a strengthened impact test, it is appropriate, we believe, that the DCLG takes account of research evidence which shows that there are parts of the UK where small stores in town centres and high streets performed more robustly between 2000 and 2006 against competitive corporate supermarket entry than is popularly believed. Additionally, we believe that such evidence should be set alongside that of the Commission itself (2007b, paragraph 36) which suggests that the smaller/flexible corporate foodstore formats of the past decade, developed with the grain of planning policy in`edge-of-centre' or in-centre' locations might have a`complementary role' to play in respect of the prospects of some types of small shops in British town centres and high streets.
